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LIMITATIONS OF Ac:noN-APPLICABLE STATUTE-THIRD-PARTY INJURY 
PROVISION AGREED TO BY CONTRACTOR SUBJECT TO CONTRACT LIMITA-
TION ONLY-More tlian two years following an accident in which they sus-
tained personal injuries when their car fell into defendant's excavation, 
plaintiffs filed a diversity action in a federal court stating inter alia a cause 
of action based upon a third-party beneficiary _contract entered into by de-
fendant street contractor and the City of Philadelphia for which he was 
working. The contract provided in essence that 4efendant alone would be 
liable for damage sustained by any third party "irrespective of whether or 
not such injuries ... be due to negligence or the inherent nature of the 
work." The district court dismissed the complaint on the ground that it 
was barred by the applicable state two year statute of limitations "for in-
juries wrongfully done to the person."1 On appeal, held, reversed. The 
1 Pa. Stat. Ann. (Purdon, 1953) tit. 12, §34: "Every suit hereafter brought to recover 
damages for injury wrongfully done 1:0 the person, in case where ill'jury does not result 
in death, must be •brought within two years from the time, when the injury was done 
and not afterwards. . • ." 
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action is -limited solely by the Pennsylvania "contract without specialty" 
statute,2 which permits commencement of an action within six years of 
breach. Thompson v. Erb, (3d Cir. 1957) 240 F. (2d) 452. 
It is generally held that where a repair or construction contract be-
tween a contractor and a municipality provides that the contractor shall 
be liable for all damages caused by his work, a person who is subsequently 
injured may recover on a third-party beneficiary contractual theory.3 
Application in the principal case of a contract, rather than a personal 
injury statute of limitations appears to be a mechanical outgrowth of 
this contract doctrine, emphasizing the form of the action and not the 
cause. While the court admitted that if the injuries were "wrongfully 
done," the action, though in contract, would be barred by the two year 
statute,4 it then proceeded to interpret "wrongful" restrictively as if it 
meant "tortious." Plaintiff did not allege any tort -liability and the court 
thus found that the action on the contract was immune from the shorter 
personal injury -limitation. This holding is contrary to the weight of 
authority.15 It has been frequently held that where a statute limits the 
time within which an action for "injuries to the person" may be brought, 
the statute is applicable to all actions designed to recover for personal 
injuries, regardless of the form of the action.6 Jurisdictions having personal 
injury statutes similar to that of Pennsylvania have generally followed this 
view,7 and a recent New Jersey case involving a similar third-party 
beneficiary contract reached a result opposed to that of the principal 
case.8 A strong policy argument dictates a construction directed at the 
shorter limitation period in personal injury actions since evidence is 
usually wholly oral and is likely to be obscured by delay through death, 
absence, or failure of memory.9 There is, however, some authority to the 
contrary which allows the form of action to govern the choice of statute.10 
In a few jurisdictions the problem has been resolved by more careful 
draftsmanship, making clear which statute would govern in a given 
situation.11 Pennsylvania's personal injury statute of limitations does not 
2 Id., §31, which provides that all actions of "debt grounded upon any •.. contract 
without specialty • . • shall be commenced and sued within • • . six years. . . ." 
8 49 L.R.A. (n.s.) 1171 (1914); 1 CONTRACTS R.EsTATEMENT §145, comment a, illus. ll 
(1932). 
4 Jones v. Boggs &: Buhl, Inc., 355 Pa. 242, 49 A. (2d) 379 (1946). 
IS Cases collected at 157 A.L.R. 763 (1945). 
6 Id. at 766. 
7 E.g., Andrianos v. Community Traction Co., 155 Ohio St. 47, 97 N.E. (2d) 549 (1951); 
Bodne v. Austin, 156 Tenn. 353, 2 S.W. (2d) 100 (1927); Finck v. Albers Super Market, 
Inc., (6th Cir. 1943) 136 F. (2d) 191 (interpreting the Kentucky statute). 
s Burns v. Bethlehem Steel Co., 20 N.J. 37, 118 A. (2d) 544 (1955). 
o Andrianos v. Community Traction Co., note 7 supra, at 52. 
10 Cases collected at 157 A.L.R. 763 at 777 (1945). 
11 Ore. Rev. Stat. (1953) §12.110: "An action for ... any injury to the person or 
rights of another, not arising on contract, ... shall be commenced within two years ...... 
E.g., Mass. Laws. Ann. (1952) c. 260, §2A; Minn. Stat. {1953) §541.07. 
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appear to require the strict construction given in the principal case which 
seems to be in conflict with previous state precedent.12 No statutory 
definition limits the meaning of "wrongful" to negligent, intentional, 
or any other specific type of wrongful act. It is indicated by prior 
Pennsylvania decisions that the courts have regarded "wrongful" as 
synonymous with "giving rise to a cause of action," and in personal 
injury cases have found it to be immaterial whether the cause resulted 
from a breach of contract or a tort without a contract.13 The words of 
the statute are general, and there is nothing to indicate that a general class 
was not intended to be covered, viz., "Every suit to recover damages for 
injuries ·wrongfully done to the person."14 Such an interpretation would 
appear to have been especially warranted with respect to the present con-
tract, in which defendant has assumed strict liability for personal injuries. 
While the assumption was contractual in form, its effect is to eliminate the 
necessity of plaintiff's specific allegation of duty and breach. This con-
cession should not be expanded by lengthening the period for bringing 
an action beyond the normal personal injury statutory period. To do so 
places an additional and unwarranted burden on the defendant. 
Walter L. Adams 
12 The prevailing view in Pennsylvania was well summarized in the oft-quoted 
opinion of Nightlinger v. Johnson, 18 Pa. D. & C. 47 at 48 (1932): " •.. what did the 
legislature mean by 'every suit hereafter .brought to recover damages for injury wrong-
fully done to the person.' It meant, of course, every suit, be it assumpsit, trespass, tres-
pass on the case, or any other kind of a suit by which damages for personal injuries 
could be collected." 
13 Bradley v. Laubach & Pflieger, 23 Pa. Dist. R. 151 (1914). 
H Rodebaugh v. Philadelphia Traction Co., 190 Pa. 358, 42 A. 953 (1899). 
